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Turn over a copy of David Enoch’s Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust 
Realism, and you will find the usual array of quotations extolling the book’s virtues. 
The first is from Russ Shafer-Landau—arguably the philosopher most responsible for 
the current resurgence of Moorean-style non-naturalism—who writes that this “is the 
best book that has ever been written in defense of ethical realism.” The last is from 
Hartry Field, who claims that “on the scale of texts arguing for an obviously false 
conclusion, this actually ranks pretty high!” 
These particular quotations nicely reflect the central take-home messages of 
this review: First, that this is a book that anyone with an interest in metaethics—not 
to mention a number of other philosophical disciplines—should read. Second, that it 
does less than one might hope when it comes to adjudicating the disputes between 
opposing metaethical camps. Of course, it is true of most metaethics—if not most 
philosophy—that it rarely persuades the opposition. But part of what makes this case 
distinctive is that for some opponents, at least, it seems Enoch would not merely fail 
to persuade them to become Robust Realists; he would ultimately bolster their 
confidence in their preferred views.  
Enoch is convinced—or at least suspicious—that there can be no knock-down 
arguments for one metaethical theory over another. In light of this, he suggests that 
we should proceed by looking at the arguments for and objections to each of the 
available options and determine which, at the end of the day, has the most 
“plausibility points” (pp. 14-15). Enoch thinks he has found the winner: Robust 
Realism. On this view, moral and, more broadly, normative facts are sui generis, non-
natural, irreducible, metaphysically autonomous facts about what we ought to do, 
what is valuable, what matters, etc. that exist, as it were, in Plato’s Heaven.  
The book can be split roughly in two. In Chapters 2-5, Enoch’s goal is to 
motivate Robust Realism—to gain it plausibility points—by arguing that the view 
makes sense of everything a metanormative or metaethical view needs to make sense 
of—at least, on balance, better than the competition. In Chapters 6-9, Enoch turns to 
defense, arguing that a number of objections to Robust Realism are either entirely 
misguided or weak enough that the plausibility points lost are relatively insignificant.  
Enoch begins, in Chapter 2, with an argument for the objectivity of moral 
truth. When people disagree about something, Enoch points out, there is a moral 
question as to whether they should compromise or stick to their guns. The right 
answer, he says, depends on the subject matter. When we disagree about things that 
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ultimately depend in some way on our attitudes—like, perhaps, where would be best 
to go for dinner—we should compromise. When we disagree about things where there 
is some objective fact of the matter—like whether the earth is flat—we should, or at 
least may, stick to our guns. Since, he thinks we will agree, it is right to stick to our 
guns where morality is concerned, this indicates that there is some objective fact of 
the matter about morality. So non-objective metaethical views—including, for Enoch, 
both obviously subjectivist views but also various forms of constructivism and non-
cognitivism—are false. 
In Chapter 3, Enoch offers an argument from “deliberative indispensability” 
for the existence of Robust normative facts. He begins with a general discussion of 
parsimony. He accepts that parsimony has theoretical value, and thus that we should 
worry about accepting theories that include redundant elements. But while generally 
our worries about parsimony are reflected in worries about explanatory 
indispensability, he argues, it is possible, even quite plausible, that theoretical 
elements can be indispensable in other ways. And so if, as Enoch believes, Robust 
normative facts are indispensable for deliberation—and deliberation is itself 
important—acceptance of such facts is hardly ontologically profligate.  
Chapters 2 and 3 are the central elements of Enoch’s positive case for Robust 
Realism, so let us pause for some preliminary critical observations. In Chapter 5, 
Enoch mentions that he sees normative error theory as a sort of second-best 
metanormative option, because “error theorists do not kid themselves about the 
commitments of normative discourse, and they proceed to boldly follow the 
argument from these commitments and the belief that they are unsatisfied to its 
natural, if extreme, conclusion.” (p. 115).  
Given this, it is rather surprising that Enoch’s argument for objectivity in 
Chapter 2 should leave error theory out in the cold. After all, Enoch’s argument relies 
centrally on a substantive moral premise—something the error theorist clearly cannot 
accept. Of course, this does not mean that Enoch’s argument fails as an argument for 
objectivity. But it does imply that the argument fails to fully capture the reasons 
objectivists have for being objectivists, at least insofar as error theorists are 
warranted in being objectivists. Given Enoch’s respect for error theory, it seems he 
should agree that there must be a more ecumenical argument in the offing.  
Turning to Chapter 3: Enoch’s argument from deliberative indispensability is 
innovative and important. Indeed, this chapter is an excellent indication of the book’s 
breadth, and why it should be of interest even to those outside metaethics, given the 
broad applicability of the discussions of parsimony and indispensability. If nothing 
else, then, this chapter is useful in that it illuminates the possibility of non-
explanatory indispensability. Arguably, the arguments in this chapter are also 
successful at countering the worry that Robust normative facts are just obviously 
theoretically extravagant. But elegant as the arguments are, the proof is in the 
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pudding: The question is not whether deliberative indispensability can, in theory, 
justify acceptance of otherwise redundant theoretical elements, but whether Robust 
normative facts really are indispensable.  
Enoch says a bit in this chapter in support of such indispensability. It seems 
worth highlighting one aspect of this discussion because, whether or not there is 
something inherently problematic in what Enoch says, it is particularly striking given 
his other commitments. Enoch points out that just because a theoretical element is 
indispensable for a particular project, this does not mean that we are therefore 
justified in including that element in our ontology. Such “instrumental 
indispensability” for a project has ontological implications only insofar as the project 
itself it is “intrinsically indispensable.” Enoch suggests that deliberation is 
indispensable in this way at least in part because it is “rationally non-optional” (pp. 
69-71). 
This claim needs a lot of defense, but let us set that aside. The focus here is 
on how striking this claim is given the work Enoch has done elsewhere to undermine 
constitutivist views according to which normative truth is derivable from the 
demands of agency. Enoch’s position has been—very roughly—that such views fail 
because they necessarily leave open the question of why one ought to be an agent at 
all. But if one understands what it is to be an agent just as being confronted with the 
question of what one ought to do—as Christine Korsgaard sometimes seems to—then 
it seems that perhaps either (a) Enoch is hinting at a potential solution: being an agent 
is rationally non-optional or (b) Enoch runs up against his own argument: saying that 
deliberation is rationally non-optional is question-begging precisely because it is a 
normative claim, and thus just as the constitutivist cannot use it to ground her view, 
as this would be circular, Enoch arguably cannot appeal to a normative fact to explain 
why normative facts are indispensable. Now, certainly, no pretense should be made 
that this is a fully thought-out objection. But it is nevertheless worth noting if only 
because the link is so striking. Indeed, Enoch even comments on the “Kantian” nature 
of his argument (p. 76). 
That aside, the bit about rational non-optionality is meant to show only that 
deliberation is “intrinsically indispensable.” It remains to be shown that Robust 
normative facts are in fact instrumentally indispensable for deliberation. The bulk of 
Enoch’s case for this claim comes in Chapter 5, with his rejection of naturalism, 
fictionalism, error theory and quietism—alternatives that might make good on 
normativity’s role in deliberation while “doing with less” metaphysically-speaking.  
Before getting to these, Enoch uses Chapter 4 to combine his arguments from 
the previous two chapters in order to defend Robust Metaethical Realism. In brief, 
Enoch offers reasons for thinking that if one accepts Robust Metanormative Realism, 
as argued for in Chapter 3, then given the relationship between morality and 
normativity, it makes sense to further accept Robust Realism about the metaethical. 
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He goes on to consider and reject some general worries—such as about categoricity—
that might lead one to be suspicious of Robust Realism about moral facts even if one 
accepts it about normative ones. 
Before considering Enoch’s arguments in Chapter 5 in more detail, let us 
continue on to the second half of the book. By the end of Chapter 5, Enoch takes 
himself to have garnered a significant number of plausibility points for Robust 
Realism. But, of course, Robust Realism is also subject to a number of important 
objections. Were any of these successful, the loss in plausibility points might more 
than make up for what has been gained. So in Chapters 6-9, Enoch addresses some of 
the objections historically raised against his view. 
In Chapter 6, Enoch tackles metaphysical objections. Most of his work here 
is in addressing the worry that non-naturalists cannot make sense of the 
supervenience of the moral on the non-moral. Enoch points out that this is actually 
two challenges: one, “general supervenience,” to explain why the moral supervenes 
on the non-moral at all, and the other, “specific supervenience,” to explain why the 
moral properties supervene on the particular non-moral properties they do (pp. 142-
143). General supervenience, Enoch claims, can be dealt with by an appeal to 
conceptual necessity—it is part of our moral concepts that the moral supervenes on 
the non-moral.  
Specific supervenience is more difficult, Enoch admits. He does a bit to try to 
soften the blow, but ultimately concludes that Robust Realism is indeed committed to 
some basic, substantive moral facts—that is, some relations between moral and non-
moral properties—that have no explanation, that are brute. He acknowledges that this 
violates the widely-held “Hume’s Dictum” that there can be no “necessary relations 
between distinct existences” (p. 147). But, ultimately, it seems to Enoch that if he can 
have everything he wants just so long as he gives up this “piece of metaphysical 
dogma,” he is really not so badly off (p. 148). 
In Chapter 7, Enoch turns to epistemological objections. There are many, and 
so Enoch first develops what he sees as the best version of the challenge: to explain 
correlations between normative beliefs and normative facts. As he points out, 
correlations are typically explained by showing that one correlate explains the other. 
Unfortunately, explanations of this kind for the correlation between normative 
beliefs and normative facts are, it seems, ruled out by the combination of Robust 
Realism’s commitment to some version of the thesis of attitude-, mind-, response-, or 
stance-independence, its commitment to the metaphysical autonomy of the 
normative, and the fact that Robust normative properties are almost certainly 
causally inefficacious. 
Enoch’s innovation is to recognize a third form of explanation for 
correlations: The correlation between normative beliefs and normative facts might 
be explained by a third factor that generates a sort of “pre-established harmony” 
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between them (p. 168). He proposes that such an explanation might be had by looking 
to evolution. This is ironic, given that the current fashion is to use evolution to make 
the challenge. Enoch’s suggestion, very roughly, is that if we grant that survival is 
good, then when evolutionary pressures explain our normative beliefs, they also 
ensure that those beliefs track something good, since it is survival—which, again, is 
good—that generates these pressures in the first place. 
Next, in Chapter 8, Enoch considers arguments from moral disagreement. 
Here, he distinguishes and tackles an impressive list of such arguments—everything 
from the simplest, invalid argument that disagreement entails skepticism to more 
sophisticated abductive arguments. Enoch addresses each in turn, arguing of each 
formulation either that it fails outright, that it reduces to an objection addressed 
elsewhere in the book, or at least that there is enough hope of overcoming it to leave 
Robust Realism on solid ground. He concludes that arguments from actual 
disagreement have little to no force against Robust Realism, while arguments from 
idealized disagreement will lose the view some—but probably not very many—
plausibility points. 
In Chapter 9, Enoch addresses the purported connection between normativity 
and motivation. Enoch begins by laying out his theory of what it is to act for a reason, 
and distinguishes the idea of an “agent’s reason” for acting from motivational and 
normative reasons (p. 221). He then argues that Robust Realism is consistent with 
acting for a reason—something some have been concerned the view could not make 
sense of. Next, he addresses other issues about motivation, including the worry that 
Robust Realism is incompatible with normativity’s being “practically relevant,” the 
“why be moral?” question, and both judgement and existence internalisms about 
reasons (pp. 237-266). In each case, he argues that the worries about Robust Realism 
are likely illusory. He concludes that Robust Realism loses no plausibility points 
because of motivation. He then recaps his arguments throughout the book and tallies 
Robust Realism’s plausibility points in a final chapter. 
By this point, the grounds for our first take-home message—that anyone with 
an interest in metaethics should read this book—should be fairly clear:. There are, as 
one might expect, small things throughout to quibble with. For example, Enoch’s 
discussion in Chapter 7 of the forms of explanation one might offer for a correlation 
is somewhat lacking. Indeed, I argue elsewhere that Enoch misidentifies the form of 
his solution. But for the most part, the arguments are careful and even persuasive. 
Aside from anything else, insofar as this book is meant to show that Robust Realism 
is a metaethical contender that must be taken seriously, it passes with flying colors. 
The problems come when one considers the book as a positive argument for Robust 
Realism as the best view on the table.  
Here is a very rough reconstruction of the line of argument in this book: 
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(1) Moral beliefs concern something objective. 
(2) If Robust normative facts are indispensable for deliberation, we have 
some reason to believe in them, and thus to accept Robust Metanormative 
Realism. 
(3) Insofar as we have reason to accept Robust Metanormative Realism, we 
have reason to accept Robust Metaethical Realism. 
(4) Robust normative facts are indispensable for deliberation because 
alternatives to Robust Realism that are consistent with (1) and with 
normativity’s role in deliberation fail. 
(5) None of the metaphysical, epistemological, semantic or psychological 
objections to Robust Realism are significantly damaging. 
(6) Therefore, we have most reason to accept Robust Realism in both 
metaethics and metanormative theory. 
Now suppose you held any of the following metanormative or metaethical 
views: constitutivism, error theory, fictionalism, naturalism, quasi-realism, quietism. 
There is a good chance that you would accept (1) and (2). Depending on whether your 
view is metanormative or metaethical, you might also accept (3). It turns out, then, 
that you might well read the first one hundred pages—four chapters—of Enoch’s book 
without batting an eyelash, with a few notable exceptions. Given the large percentage 
of ethicists and metaethicists who accept one of the views mentioned, then, it seems 
that the bulk of Enoch’s work—insofar as he is pushing for Robust Realism over these 
alternatives—will be in defending (4) and (5).  
The first bit of defense of (4) comes in Chapter 2—one of those notable 
exceptions within the first hundred pages—where Enoch addresses constitutivism 
and quasi-realism. Enoch thinks that these views are going to turn out to be 
inconsistent with morality’s objectivity. The argument against quasi-realism is 
basically that a view on which the moral truth depends in some important way on 
our moral attitudes—like quasi-realism—cannot possibly be objective in the relevant 
sense. Now, that may well be true. But it is not clear how this argument moves the 
dialectic forward. After all, here is what a quasi-realist—of one kind, at least—thinks: 
Moral language expresses non-cognitive moral attitudes, but nevertheless the 
deflated moral truths this language concerns are appropriately objective. So to some 
extent, Enoch’s objection seems to be little more than a restatement of the quasi-
realist’s view. Now, certainly, it would be uncharitable to say that Enoch’s objection 
is just a restatement of the view. But the argument does have a bit of a foot-stomping 
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feel. It is little more than insistence that quasi-realists cannot do what they think they 
can do. 
The rest of the views mentioned—error theory, fictionalism, naturalism and 
quietism—are addressed in Chapter 5. Let us focus on naturalism—though in fairness 
to Enoch, it should be noted that at the end of the book, when he lists the bits that he 
is least confident in, he is explicit that he wishes he had more to say against naturalist 
views. Enoch says a number of interesting things about how to talk about reduction 
so as to step on as few metaphysical toes as possible, about the objections to 
naturalism already present in the literature, and about why a particular argument 
from Mark Schroeder that is supposed to speak in favor of naturalistic reduction 
actually seems to speak against it. Ultimately, though, what Enoch relies on most 
heavily is the idea that moral and normative properties are “just so different” from 
naturalistic properties that the former could not possibly reduce to the latter (p. 80). 
Now, suppose you are a committed naturalist of a particular sort. You read 
the first hundred pages of Enoch’s book and find that you agree with nearly 
everything he says. You agree that when we disagree about moral matters, we should 
stand our ground. You agree that normative truth of some kind is indispensable for 
deliberation. And you agree that we should treat morality and normativity roughly 
the same, metaphysically-speaking. Then you get to Chapter 5, where you read a 
careful and well-thought-out explanation of why Enoch rejects your view. But careful 
and clear as it may be, at the end it comes down to a just-too-different intuition, 
which you have been hearing about from every non-naturalist you have ever met.  
At this point, if you are anything like Enoch, you will start counting 
plausibility points. You have gained a number of points relative to certain other views 
because of Enoch’s arguments in Chapters 2 and 3. So now you have a whole bunch 
of plausibility points that you may or may not have taken yourself to have before you 
started reading. In fact, you have roughly the same number of plausibility points as 
Robust Realism, and that is a lot more than some alternatives!  
Now, you know that if you go Enoch’s Robustly Realist route you will start 
losing points, at least because you will have to accept non-naturalism. But luckily for 
you, you do not share his just-too-different intuition, so in sticking with your own 
view and rejecting that intuition, you do not lose many plausibility points—or at least 
so it will seem to you. And so if you have, or think you can develop, a view that can 
deal with all of the other objections Enoch mentions—open question arguments, 
moral twin earth, etc.—then it seems your view is looking at least as attractive as it 
was before you began reading, if not significantly more so.  
Of course, the question is not just who has the best positive case, but who 
loses the most plausibility points to attacks. And you might not be as confident as 
you would like about your particular reductive story. So you turn to the second half 
of the book, which comprises Enoch’s defense of (5) in the loose reconstruction of his 
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overall argument above, to see if Robust Realism is, after all, more plausible than you 
thought it was.  
There is something that is at once incredibly admirable and incredibly 
frustrating about the second half of Enoch’s book: Enoch seems to try very, very hard 
to get the objections to his view as clear and strong as possible before responding to 
them. Arguably the best example of this comes in his discussion of epistemological 
objections in Chapter 7. There are many, many different epistemological challenges 
to realism in the literature. So Enoch offers a general challenge that bypasses a host 
of contentious epistemological assumptions built into the original objections as 
presented. After all, it is doubtful that most non-Robust Realists take their objections 
to succeed because of their particular epistemological views—the problem is not 
really about justification per se rather than, say, reliability. So by moving to a 
challenge to explain a correlation that, it seems, every non-skeptic is committed to, 
Enoch both strengthens our understanding of the real issue and makes his ultimate 
response that much more powerful. 
But Enoch’s hard work in these areas is also a source of frustration in at least 
two ways. The first is in comparing Enoch’s reconstruction of others’ objections with 
his development of his own. Contrast, for example, the thirty-two-page Chapter 8 in 
which Enoch attempts to distinguish all the ways in which one might use moral 
disagreement to make trouble for Robust Realism with the short section in Chapter 
5—one quarter the length—in which he rejects naturalism. One has to wonder why, 
when Enoch is so careful to try to figure out what is behind the objections to his view, 
he is willing to play somewhat fast and loose with his own objections—saying very 
little, for example, about exactly why it is that moral facts are just too different to be 
natural. 
The other source of frustration along these lines is that despite his hard work, 
it seems that Enoch’s careful formulations of his opponents’ objections sometimes 
fail to capture their real worries. Now, in all fairness, this is not entirely—probably 
not even largely—Enoch’s fault. Indeed, the mere fact that he has to spend so much 
time and effort clarifying the objections against his view speaks to how poor, or at 
least how varied, the original formulations of these objections often are. 
Nevertheless, Enoch has asked us to join him in counting up more plausibility points 
for Robust Realism than for any alternative, and here he arguably falls short.  
First, setting aside for the moment the worry about getting the objections 
right, it is not at all clear that Enoch’s plausibility point losses are as low as he thinks. 
Consider again his arguments about epistemology. According to Enoch, his losses are 
minimal here because it turns out that if survival is good and the best way for our 
normative beliefs to promote survival is for them to be true and this can account for 
enough of our normative beliefs to satisfy the non-skeptic’s worry, then the Robust 
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Realist has a way to explain the correlation between normative beliefs and normative 
facts.  
Now, how many plausibility points this story loses him is up for debate. But 
two things should be noted: First, the plausibility points game is a comparative one, 
and it certainly seems as though the above explanation is comparatively less 
plausible, all else being equal, than, say, the explanation that there is a causal 
connection between our beliefs and the natural properties normative properties 
reduce to.  
Second, one must be careful—which it is not always clear Enoch is—not to 
infer from Robust Realism’s mere ability to explain some X that it does not lose a 
significant number of plausibility points with respect to X. After all, the whole point 
of plausibility points was supposed to be that we are moving away from attempts to 
show that a view is utterly devastated by its complete inability to make sense of 
something and instead considering its relative plausibility with respect to other 
contenders. So surely how many plausibility points a view loses in its attempts to 
explain X depends not just on whether it can, but on how far it has to bend over 
backwards to get an explanation off the ground. And with the evolution-based story, 
one might very well worry that Robust Realism is going to get a hernia. 
In any case, let us return to the concern that Enoch is not always successful 
in his attempts to understand what is going on in the objections he addresses. Perhaps 
the clearest case is in his discussion of the objection from supervenience in Chapter 
6. Enoch spends a great deal of time explaining how Robust Realism can make sense 
of specific supervenience and defending his rejection of Hume’s Dictum. His 
discussion of how to explain general supervenience is comparatively short: He simply 
appeals to the fact that it is a conceptual truth.  
But this seems too quick. Normative supervenience might well be a 
conceptual truth. But there remains a worry that Robust Realism is in tension with 
its being so. Out there in Plato’s Heaven there is a non-natural, abstract property of 
goodness. Somehow, here on Earth, we know that this property is related to the non-
moral such that there can be no change in a thing’s goodness without a change in its 
non-moral properties. Not only do we know this, but we know it as a matter of 
conceptual necessity. Now this is decidedly bizarre. It is difficult to see how it could 
be that when this concept developed, it captured a necessary fact about this 
property—that it supervenes. And, for that matter, it seems we should wonder why 
it supervenes at all, why this non-natural property of goodness cannot just attach 
itself to whatever it feels like, so to speak. 
The above is, of course, quite inchoate. And it may or may not be the concern 
had by all or most of those Enoch is responding to—though Tristram McPherson does 
raise related worries in a paper Enoch makes reference to. Nevertheless, it does seem 
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to be a genuine worry about Robust Realism’s ability to account for supervenience. 
And it is a worry that Enoch does not address.  
At the close of the book, Enoch invites the reader to share his conclusions: 
[W]hen I look at the project as a whole, I find myself reasonably 
confident in it and its conclusions. Perhaps somewhat paradoxically, 
I find myself more confident in the general picture than in some of its 
details. Trying to tally plausibility points, then, I find myself thinking 
that Robust Realism does pretty well, better, in fact, than competing 
views. Don’t you? [p. 271] 
For those friendly to non-naturalism, it seems the answer would be a 
resounding yes. Enoch’s book is full of interesting, important, clear and, frankly, fun 
arguments. And insofar as you share his inclinations, you are likely to find a good 
deal to vindicate your shared intuitions in the pages of this book. The trouble is that 
insofar as you do not—insofar as you lack the just-too-different intuition, or think an 
expressivist semantics can capture objectivity, or think that the supervenience 
objection is not quite what Enoch says—you will probably find more in this book to 
support the view you prefer than you will cause to become a Robust Realist. Then 
again, that is really not so bad. Because whoever Enoch’s arguments ultimately 
support, they are, to echo Shafer-Landau, some of the best you will find. 
